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ABSTRACT
The Naval Air Combat Readiness Training Program, "Proficiency
Flying," is a firm and legal part of U So Naval Aviation and vast
quantities of manpower, aircraft, and dollar resources are assembled
to enable deck and desk bound Naval Aviators to fly In the hope of
releasing some of these resources to alternative uses, the Program's
contribution to combat readiness was investigated,. A thorough review
of the literature was followed by an analysis of the affect on readi-
ness of selected flight background variables from a sample of 39
pilots undergoing jet replacement squadron transition training,, The
study concludes that the Naval Air Combat Readiness Training Program
is a necessary part of Naval Aviation but certain modifications
should be entertained
•
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CHAPTER I
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
Background
Naval Air Combat Readiness Training, based on Public Law and de-
fined in Executive Orders and Navy Directives, is officially accepted
as vital to Naval Aviation. Implementation of the concept enables all
Naval Aviators to meet certain annual flying requirements designed to
maintain minimum levels of flight proficiency. Without such a Pro-
ficiency Flying Program pilots would be grounded by periodic rotation
to ship, staff, and station assignments thought necessary to: (1)
broad professional development, (2) the integration of aviation with
the rest of the Navy. Conventionally, such grounded periods would
lead to excessive deterioration of complex pilot skills. Long non-
flying periods have been contributory to high accident rates and some
non-flying aviators have lost all interest in flying. With a Combat
Readiness Training (CRT) Program, such skill deterioration may be
minimized and maintenance of an immediately accessible cadre of trained
pilot and support personnel is possible. Additionally, CRT provides
opportunity for the current flying experience thought necessary to the
best execution of many ship, station^ and staff assignments. Finally,
the Program generates significant numbers of morale enhancing shore
duty billets for many enlisted ratings. Historically, these arguments,
and others, have jelled into a strong case for the continuation of the
CRT Program. Vast quantities of manpower, dollars, and equipment have
been assembled to provide opportunity for deck and desk bound Naval

Aviators to fly„ Proficiency Flying is a firm and legal part of the
conventional wisdom and tradition of U« S u Naval Aviationo
The Naval CRT tradition began and matured in the between war
years of isolation and depression when the keystone of National
Strategy was mobilization and aviation technology adole scent Mobili-
zation depended upon a nucleus of trained personnel and pilot rotation
not only enhanced individual professional development but also expanded
this nucleus while economizing on facilities and equipment „ In
essence , it was an extension of "buying one aeroplane and allowing the
aviators to take turns flying ito"l The aviation technology of the
times facilitated the concept. Though by 194.0 most airplanes had
closed cockpits and retractable landing gear 9 a 1920 pilot would not
have had much difficulty with a 1940 aircrafto Basic flying skills
were easily transferrable from model to models proficiency in one meant
proficiency in many, and rapid mobilization of non-squadron pilots was
technically feasible. Successful World War II mobilization reinforced
this conceptual keystone of National Strategy and p as an element of that
strategys CRT was born anew in the postwar years <> Final and authori-
tative recognition was received from President Truman in 1950 C233 °
Presidential Executive Order 10152 of August 17, 1950, is rooted
in the history of a pre-Nuclear Age reinforced by the experiences of
World War II. For the past fourteen years it has been the criterion
for military flight proficiency,, Yet ? in that time there have been
President Coolidge; c. 1928

marked changes in our National Strategy* Mobilization is no longer the
keystone. Most defense analysts assign a very small probability to the
recurrence of a World War II type conflict., Strategic deterrence, re-
taliation, and instant response to local limited crises are the new
cornerstones of strategy. Still, our CRT/Proficiency Requirements re-
main geared to the pre-1950 strategic concept of mobilization ,
Since 1950 aviation technology has exploded <> In the sophisticated
weapons systems of 19&4 flying skills are no longer so easily trans-
ferred from model to model • In fact, Replacement Training Squadrons
(RAGs) have been established to prop3rly and safely transition pilots
into unfamiliar aircraft models. Air Type Commanders place stringent
restrictions on model transitions outside the purview of the RAGo Yet,
the CRT concept is based upon historical premises prevalent when any
competent aviator could (and did) say, "Show me how to start it and
I'll fly it 1" The equipment and the attitudes have changed but CRT has
not.
Purpose of the Study
A concept unchanged in the face of shifting strategies, attitudes,
and technology raises the possibility of streamlining and economy.
Common sense suggested examination of the possibility! the President,
the Secretary of the Navy, and the Chief of Naval Operations demanded
its
THE PRESIDENT HAS STATED CLEARIY HIS OBJECTIVES ON
ECONOMY IN WHICH FRUGALITY IS EXPECTED AT ALL ECHELONS . . .
SECNAV AND THE CNO ARE DETERMINED THAT THE NAVY SHALL DO
LIKEWISE, IN THE FACE OF INCREASING COSTS THE NAVY MUST
IMPROVE ITS ABILITY TO MEET CURRENT COMMITMENTS WITH LEAST

COST AND WITHIN APPROVED RESOURCES. THE ANSWER LIES
IN RUTHLESS ELIMINATION OF THOSE COSTS WHICH DO NOT
ENHANCE COMBAT READINESS . . . EXAMINE CRITICALLY
EVERY PROGRAM TO DETERMINE THAT IT WILL IN FACT MAKE
A NECESSARY CONTRIBUTION TO COMBAT READINESS .... [ll] .
To determine whether the current Proficiency Flying Program makes
necessary contributions to Naval Air Combat Readiness was the broad
purpose of this study.
Framework of the Study
Initial study revealed that the broad purpose could best be served
by a two-step investigation: (1) comprehensive review of the litera-
ture, (2) an experimental test of contributions to combat readiness
from the current Proficiency Flying Program* Such an approach has
facilitated a maximum contribution to the knowledge while remaining
within the environmental constraints. Both steps were designed to gain
the greatest insight into the problems of CRT philosophies and measure-
ments and to provide a framework and a bibliography for use in similar
future study as well as to serve the stated purpose.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Sources Searched
Background literature relevant to Naval Air Combat Readiness
Training, while generally scarce, derives from widespread source s. The
search for literature ranged the field of government, military planning
and economics, psychology, and several types of military management,.
By way of personal correspondence, interview, and library research^ per-
tinent literature derived from each of these fields was obtained through
persons and agencies shown in Table I.
Selection Criteria
The relative scarcity of pertinent literature dictated a compara-
tively unconstrained selection criteria o Consequently, any literature
touching upon the following subjects was reviewed.
Combat Readiness Training and Proficiency Flying Any literature
encountered which dealt in any way with either Air Force or Navy Com-
bat Readiness Training, any military or civilian flying proficiency
programs or criteria, or any study regarding flying currency and indi-
vidual performance was considered
»
Incentive and/or Hazardous Duty Pay , While flight pay was not the
subject of the study, it was found that much literature ostensibly de-
voted to Incentive and/or Hazardous

TABLE I
SOURCES OF PERTINENT LITERATURE
Legislative
U. S. Senator from author's home state
Congressman from author's home district
Mr. Harry L. Wingate, Jr., Chief Clerk,
U. S. Senate Committee on Armed Services
Mr. John R. Blandford, Chief Counsel, House of
Representatives Committee on Armed Services
Military
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations* Flight
Operations Division (OP-53)
U. S. Naval School of Aviation Medicine
U. So Naval Aviation Safety Center
U. S. Air Force Directorate of Aerospace Safety
Various Navy and Air Force Directives
Academic
Library, U. S. Naval Postgraduate School
Library, U. S. Army Human Research Unit, Monterey
Air University Annotated List of Student Research
Reports
Air University Periodical Index (1949-1963)
Other
Federal Air Regulations
Air Line Pilots Association

Duty Pay related to the CRT Program Unfortunately, the conventional
wisdom generated by the mixing of two separate concepts has, on
occasion, clouded both. To preclude such an occurence in this study
the issue of flight pay was assumed irrelevant and only those por-
tions of such literature which related to readiness and skill retention
were considered.,
Long Term Retention of Learned Skill
s
» Consideration was given to
all available literature relating to long term retention of learned
skills. Emphasis was given, of course, to reports regarding retention
of pilot skills but such a constraint was not found to be necessary in
order to preclude an inundation of information
„
Pilot Proficiency Mea surement « Any available literature pertinent
to the measurement of pilot skills or proficiency was considered rel-=
evant and reviewed
•
The reader is assured that, as of the date of this report, all
unclassified literature pertinent to the above criteria and available
from the sources searched has been considered and is listed in the
bibliography o The more important works are reviewed in the following
paragraphs »
The Review
To facilitate the review, the literature has been classified into
three areas: Historical Bases, Official Positions, and Psychological
o
The reader interested in the validity of this assumption is re-
ferred to Alain C» Enthoven, Supply and Demand and Military Pay^ Rand
Corporation Paper P-1186 (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.,
30 September 1957).

Certain spillovers are evident, but such a format did provide for an
orderly investigation and presentation*,
Historical Bases * Largely as a result of historical experiences,
the entire literature reflects a general conviction that some certain
amount of regular flight practice is necessary to safe pilot perfor-
mance * The Report of the Strauss Commission [2§J provides a very lucid
presentation of historical reasons for the maintenance of a military
Proficiency Flying Program In the report is recounted the failure of
a circa 1930 Marine Corps policy of rotating pilots off flight status e
Also included is an accounting of a huge waste of pilot, aircraft, and
dollar resources in the re-training of 500 Inactive Reserve aviators
who volunteered for active duty at the start of the Korean War„ As a
result of these, and other, experiences the report found as one of its
conclusions:
Where personal flight proficiency is maintained, the
transition from an administrative flying assignment to an
operational flying assignment is easy and rapid; where it
is allowed to deteriorate the transition is difficult,
costly, and too time consuming . . 60
Similar conclusions derived from more recent experiences formed the
basis for the 1961 testimony of an Assistant Secretary of Defense:
„ » , it requires intensive application on a con-
tinuing basis to accumulate the degree of skill and
experience necessary to progress and remain in this
career,, It is not a qualification which can be
attained easily or continued on an off-again-on-again
basis [24] o
Additionally, flight safety activities have published studies which
show that, up to a point, incidence of aircraft accidents is inversely
proportional to pilot time £21,28,30] . Still other studies of pro-
8

ficiency flying have been made and each concludes, on the basis of pest
performance, that it is prudent to maintain the flying skills of
aviators who have future flying potential [3,7,16,21] »
Official Positions . Based upon historical experiences, the mili-
tary services and each of the non-military agencies queried subscribe
to the need for regular flying „ Navy and Air Force Directives define
the Proficiency Flying Porgrams and, though critical of certain
practices, the General Accounting Office officially recognizes the
basic need f7j e The Naval Aviation Safety Center goes beyond mere
recognition of the need, however, and has provided a report urging the
establishment of a "Professional Carrier Jet Pilot Program f27] o
Participants in such a program would maintain proficiency through
continuous cockpit assignment thereby precluding loss of basic flying
skill So The report hypothesizes that the risk now inherent in
transitioning from proficiency to cockpit assignment would be elimi-
nated with a consequent increase in readiness and decrease in
resource expenditure.. While the proposal would do much to enhance
aviation readiness, the question of whether or not it suboptimizes the
broader problem of overall Navy readiness is not answered o The fact
that a proposal of this type has been made by such a responsible
agency, however, is, in itself, a strong case in point for some sort of
program for the maintenance of basic flying skills o On the non-mili-
tary side, with regard to commercial pilots in particular, the Civil
Aeronautics Board lays down current proficiency requirements and the
Air Line Pilots Association is in complete agreement with their

position [lj . Thus, the major agencies concerned with retention of
basic flying skills encourage and require frequent practice toward such
retention,. With the exception of the Safety Center's report, however,
none of the official directives or papers offer detailed reasons for
their requirements o The chance exists that they all agree with the
thoughts expressed in a letter received from the Naval School of Avia-
tion Medicine
:
-
-»-
Assumptions are made as to the possible deleterious
effects of lack of practice in flying „ „ o But like
most of the problems in life, decisions on these things
are based on general experience and common serise rather
than research data [29] »
Psychological o Psychological study offers the best opportunity
for gathering the research data needed to preclude potentially waste-
ful "common sense" decisions «, For years, the measurement of pilot
proficiency, either in or out of an aircraft, has been beset by a
multitude of theoretical and practical difficulties » This is due to
many factors, but especially to rater reliability, differences in
flight situations, and gaps in the understanding of the basic nature
of the flying task,, That same letter from the Naval School of Avia-
tion Medicine contained a succinct summation of the problems which
face researchers:
First, when research is done on learned skills it is
usually on some relatively sample skill such as the pursuit
rotor or something of the sort; but pilot skills (or driving
skills) are very complex composites of intellectually con-
trolled psychomotor activities. We have no demonstrably
valid way of getting comparative measurements of such com-
plex skills among groups of aviators, and since we cannot
measure them, questions of long term retention become
unanswerable
.
The situation is not quite that hopeless, however; the Naval Training
10

Device Center and the Air Force have sponsored several studies of
significance in this area
.
Naval Training Device Center studies treat, primarily, the use
of the synthetic flight trainer in maintaining basic pilot skill s«
There does exist a high probability that properly instrumented and pro-
grammed trainers can, at some future time, take the place of the entire
Proficiency Flying Program in the maintenance of basic pilot skillso
There is other value in the reports of the Center,, however One of
the most significant papers in the entire literature review was pre-
pared by the Franklin Institute for the Training Device Center [20J
This report developed methods of controlling several of the variables
so disconcerting to other researchers and, in laboratory conditions^
observers were actually able to differentiate between "natural" and
"mechanical" aviators in a scientific manner. Aviators have suspected
the existence of such a measure for years and refinement of the
technique could save uncounted proficiency flying resources. The re-
port is highly recommended to other researchers.
Though the Franklin Institute study is extremely promising^, other
methods of pilot performance measure cannot be neglected. A summary
of all proficiency measurement tools under development has been com-
piled at the Behavioral Sciences Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base £/J] . Few of the reports listed deal directly with the
proficiency measurement of pilots performing their complex tasks but
broad guidelines toward the selection of measurement criteria are pre-
sented. The paper should be considered in any research dealing with
11

measurement and long-term retention of learned skill
s
Working under Air Force contract^ Naylor and Briggs [17] recog-
nized the ability to retain a learned skill over extended time periods
is a problem which has, as yet, not been too thoroughly explored <, In
fact, the definition for "long-term" in some studies is anything over
2A hours 2 Nevertheless, in reviewing the literature on the subject,
they isolated a large number of variables and, amongst other things,
discussed two parameters of much interest in the retention of basic
flying skills s (l) retention as a function of conditions surrounding
original learning, (2) conditions existing during the interim period °
Their general conclusions with regard to these parameters werej
lo Large losses in skill occur over time; however
,
the actual function of the decrement appears
to be specific to the particular situational
parameters o
2o Rehearsal facilitates skill retention, and the
greater the degree of overt experience <, s •>
the greater the facilitation <>
3o The poorer the fidelity of the rehearsal task to
the previously learned task, the less
beneficial is rehearsal
The conclusions might be restated in terms of pilot skills and pro-
ficiency flyings
lo Large losses in skill occur over time; however, the actual
function of the decrement appears to be specific to the particular
type and frequency of flying*
2o Flying facilitates skill retention, and the greater the
amount of flying experience the greater the facilitation
12

3o The less similarity between type of operational flying and the
type of previous proficiency flying, the less beneficial the pro-
ficiency flying
o
These postulated modifications to the conclusions of others have been
tested by the experiment
o
13

CHAPTER III
THE EXPERIMENT
Background
Current proficiency flight hour requirements are based largely
upon historical "common sense" experiences with only isolated un~
controlled and recorded observations of performance., There exist
vague notions that more flight time, more jet time, or more carrier
landings make for a better carrier jet pilot, for example, but again,
very little scientific experimentation has been conducted B Safety
Centers and psychologists have compiled statistics demonstrating the
correlation between current flying and accident rate JJ28, 3l] , but
surley, to await an accident is an expensive way of measuring the
worth of a concepto Paralleling this situation is the notion that all
pilots, regardless of background or potential, need the same number of
flight hours per year to maintain their basic flying skills fjLo] <>
Other than for possible administrative convenience, no logical bases
for such policies was unearthed in the review of the literature and
for this reason an experimental test of these notions was devised.
The subjects of the test were a group of 85 Naval Aviators who
completed a replacement training squadron jet instrument flight sylla-
bus between June 1 and December 1, 1963 o All the subjects were Fleet
Replacement Pilots reporting for transition training from either sea
duty proficiency assignment or shore duty The instrument training
phase was selected for observation since it is the first flight phase
of transition training o Intuitively and by assumption such an initial
phase is most influenced by and indicative of previous flight experience
U

The instrument training phase is conducted in the TF-9J aircraft
and normally consists of ten scheduled flights » Students may^ how-
ever, skip certain flights or be required to fly extra flights depending
upon their individual progress „ Instructors grade each flight on about
20 performance characteristics and then sum the individual grades for an
overall flight grade „ The grades awarded are "Good" (G), "Average" (A),
"Below Average" (BA), and "Unsatisfactory" (D)o Any one "Unsatisfactory"
on a flight causes the whole flight to be unsatisfactory „ The instruc-
tors strive for a unit grade distribution of 20 per cent "Good," 60 per
cent "Average/' and 20 per cent combined "Below Average" and "Unsatis-
factory o" Actual totals for the observed time period were 20 per cent,
62 per centj, and 18 per cent s respectively..
Assumptions
For purposes of the experiments it was assumed that the instrument
phase grades result from pilot background (including proficiency flying)
and are indicative of pilot readiness . In accordance with pertinent
learning theory, those who are "less ready" in the beginning of the
training will make greater relative improvement during the course of
instruction j, but since the grades cover the entire length of the
syllabus there is valid basis for the assumption
It was recognized that motivation is highly influential in the
determination of syllabus progress 9 but a second assumption was that
pilots reporting to a carrier jet squadron are universally well moti=
vated and any categorization of the trait could only be "better" and
"Better ye to" Competition for cockpit assignment is keen and only a
15

we11-motivated individual could attain it» Differences in performance,
therefore, can only be attributed to differences in basic abilities or
background <
The Problem
Utilizing the assumption that the observed instrument flight grades
are indicative of readiness as the criteria, the problem to which the
experiment addressed itself wasi
Determine the contributions of CRT, proficiency
flight, experiences to the readiness of the observed
group of pilots
o
Such a determination offers a vehicle for obtaining the maximum value
for each CRT flight dollar spent
.
Procedures
The method of the experiment was primarily computational . The
first phase was a tabulation of the instrument flight grades of each of
the 85 pilot subjects.. To facilitate data handling, syllabus totals
for each individual were reduced to a point score through use of
an algebraic formulas
Score -
4G t M t 2BA + 1Ub
- G+AfBA+U
By this method, an individual progressing through the syllabus with all
"Average" flights would get a point score of 3«0o No special penalties
were assigned for extra flights and no bonuses were granted for
completing in less than the normally required ten flights
o
16

The second phase of the experiment was the ascertainment of the
individual subjects' flight backgrounds * This was done by a mailed
questionnaire o Due to certain circumstances, seven addresses could not
be obtained and these questionnaires were not mailed* Of the other 78
subjects j, replies were received from 57 <, At the time of the initial
tabulation there was no positive way of determining which of the subject
pilots were newly designated aviators reporting directly from the Naval
Air Training Commando Their replacement squadron progress was, of course,
incidental to the problem and, as they became identified through
questionnaire replies, they were eliminated from the study o This left
39 subjects who responded and about whom data was available and
pertinent o
The third and final phase of the experiment was the statistical
search for relevant relationships between background variables and the
criteria by comparing the former with the latter* The first two
variables listed could be markedly affected by presently feasible ad-
justments in the Proficiency Flying Program and the determination of their
contribution was of first importance in the experiment » Additionally,
comparison of the first variable with the criteria tested Postulate 3
of Chapter lis "The less the similarity between the type of opera-
tional flying and the type of previous proficiency flying, the less
beneficial the proficiency flying »" Variables?
lo Model aircraft most flown during the most
recent proficiency assignment*
2o Months since last jet flight*
The second two variables may be feasibly controlled by Bureau of Naval
17

Personnel officer assignment rotation policies. Were the variables to
prove significant^ however, controlled adjustments might be made in the
Proficiency Flying Program in lieu of more desireable (from the aviator's
viewpoint) rotation policy changes. In addition, comparison of the
third variable tested Postulate 1 of Chapter lis "... losses in skill
occur over time ..." Variables
i
3. Months since last regular flying assignment.
4.0 Model aircraft flown in last regular flying
assignment.
The last pair of variables which were compared are a product of total
flight background rather than mere proficiency experience, but the
determination of their contribution to readiness could indicate possible
further adjustments in the Proficiency Flying Program as well as to test
Postulate 2 of Chapter lis " . „ . the greater the amount of flying
experience the greater the skill retention." Variables:
5. Total jet flight hours.
60 Total flight hours.
Instrument syllabus performance and background data pertinent to the
variables and arranged according to the definitions stated below are
presented in Table II.
Definitions
In the listing of the variables, and in Table II, Model aircraft
was defined at "Jet" or "Prop" rather than differentiation by specific
model such as "M." or "Al." Respondents who flew at least 20 per cent
18

TABLE II
PERFORMANCE AND BACKGROUND OF SUBJECT PILOTS
Total Total Months Model Model Months Grade
flight jet since flowi CRT since
hours hours last last aircraft last
regular regular flovm jet
flying flying flight
1 5154 600 52 Jet Prop 52 2.90
2 3000 200 3 Prop => «, 48 2.80
y-~ 828 677 1 Jet == _ 1 3.20
k 1500 1350 25 Jet Jet 3 3.22
5 1730 1415 23 Jet Prop 23 3.22
6 2815 1050 41 Jet Mix 3 2.90
7 2700 2100 48 Jet Mix 1 3.67
8 3400 30 36 Prop Prop 48 2.90
9 2200 200 2 Prop Prop 2 2.85
10 934 184 Prop = 2.85
11 2260 145 38 Prop Mix 3 2.80
12 3000 1800 30 Jet Mix 6 3.70
13 2600 1000 36 Jet Jet 1 3.20
14 3900 1240 7 Jet Prop 7 3.86
15 2900 874 12 Jet Prop 12 3.71
16 2620 25 24 Prop Prop 1 2.90
17 3300 1150 55 Jet Mix 2 3.50
18 2967 2132 35 Jet Mix 1 3.00
19 3607 790 26 Jet Prop 26 3.10
20 4300 750 16 Jet Mix 1 3.50
21 3300 700 36 Prop Mix 1 3.30
22 1900 1650 27 Jet Jet 1 3.10
23 4200 600 36 Jet Mix 1 3.00
24 4700 700 72 Jet Prop 60 2.70
25 2930 995 15 Jet Mix 1 3.40
26 1600 1200 44 Jet Mix 6 2.90
27 1403 458 36 Prop Prop 45 2.90
28 970 320 1 Prop _ - 1 3.34
29 4870 400 Prop _ - 1 2.90
30 1700 1200 40 Jet Mix 6 3.20
31 850 200 1 Prop „ = 1 3.10
32 908 338 1 Prop = = 1 3.00
33 876 175 2 Prop - - 1 3.10
34 1030 360 1 Prop _ = 1 2.50
35 1850 380 42 Jet Mix 6 2.90
36 2706 71 49 Prop Mix 1 2.80
37 1422 1200 37 Jet Jet 1 3.45
38 2400 875 Jet _ ~ 3.00
39 2780 1400 1 Jet —. =» 1 3.38
19

of their proficiency time in each model ("Jet" and "Prop") were assigned
the category "Mix" for study purposes.
Proficiency assignment was defined as a duty assignment wherein
the aviator averages less than ten flight hours per month over a six
month period.
Regular flying is flying other than for mere flight proficiency and
usually involves duty in a combat or support squadron or instructor duty
in the Naval Air Training Command.
In comparing the variables with the flight grade criteria
,
the
subjects were grouped in naturally occuring clusters which appeared in
graphical plots of data. Overall instrument grades for each cluster
were then computed and compared with each other and with the overall
sample instrument flight grades. The results have been presented in
this format.
Results
Results have been derived by comparing each investigated variable
with the instrument flight grade criteria. Data thus obtained is
tabulated below.
20

Overall instrument flight grades for the 39 subject group were
:
Range: 2*50 - 3*86
Median; 3o00
Mean: 3„05
Comparison 1; Model aircraft most flown during the most recent
proficiency assignments,
Model Number Grade Median Mean
Flown Pilots
10
Range Grade
2o95
Grade
Prop 2o70 - 3 086 3*12
Mix 14 2»80 - 3*70 3*10 3ol9
Jet U 3ol0 - 3o45 3o21 3»24
In accordance with the study definition of proficiency flying, only
respondents with more than six months in proficiency assignment were
considered in this category
«
Comparison 2 : Months since last jet flight.
Elapsed Number Grade Median Mean
Months Pilots Range Grade Grade
0-3 25 2,50 - 3»67 3ol0 3»11
6 - 12 7 2o90 - 3o86 3o20 3o33
Over 13 7 2 o70 - 3*22 2o90 2c93
The discontinuity of the data was further investigated <> On the
hypothesis that certain pilots classified as having flown jet equip-
ment within the past three months were so classified on the basis of one
or two flights arranged when orders to a jet squadron materialized, the
= 3 month category was divided according to model aircraft most flown
during the most recent assignment;
21

Elapsed Model Number Grade Median Mean
Months Flown
Prop
Pilots
8
Range Grade
2o90
Grade
0-3 2o50 - 3.10 2c91
0-3 Mix 11 2o80 - 3o67 3.30 3o20
0-3 Jet 6 3ol0 _ 3.45 3.21 3.26
Though the additional analysis did not alter the discontinuity,
further investigation was not attempted.
Comparison 3 : Months since last regular flying assignment.
Elapsed Number Grade
Months Pilots Range
Median Mean
Grade Grade
3.00 3.00
3.50 3.49
3.16 3.21
3.00 3.07
2.90 3.05
- 3 11 2.50 - 3.38
7-16 5 3.00 - 3.86
23-30 6 2.90 - 3.70
35 = 38 8 2.80 - 3.45
40-72 9 2.70 - 3*67
Comparison 4 : Model aircraft flown in last regular flying
assignment.
Model Number Grade Median Mean
Flown Pilots Range Grade Grade
Prop 15 2.50 - 3.34 2.90 2.93
Jet 24 2.70 - 3.86 3.20 3.11
22

Comparison 5 : Total jet flight hours
Jet
Hours
200
Number
Pilots
9
Grade
Range
Median
Grade
2.85
Mean
Grade
25 - 2.80 - 3-10 2.90
300 - 400 6 2o50 - 3.34 2.90 2.92
600 - 900 9 2.70 - 3=71 3d0 3.16
1000 - 1450 11 2o90 - 3.86 3.22 3.29
Over 1650 4 3o00 — 3o67 3.38 3.36
Comparison 6 : Total flight hours
Total Number Grade Median Mean
Hours Pilots Range Grade Grade
800 - 1050 7 2.50 - 3.34 3.10 3.02
1400 - 1900 8 2.90 - 3o45 3.15 3d2
2200 - 3000 14 2.80 - 3o71 3.00 3.15
Over 3300 10 2.70 - 3o86 3.05 3.17
23

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions are based upon the review of the
literature and the experiment conducted.
The CRT/Proficiency Flying Concept
Though the CRT/proficiency flying concept grew out of the pre-
World War II era and has been little modified since 1950, it is
basically sound. No incidents or data were revealed which refuted
the historical experiences of the 1930 Marine Corps or the 1950 Naval
Reserves. Indeed, the results of the experiment confirm that large
losses in skill occur over time Given the present officer career
rotation pattern, this is reason enough to implement the concept
»
Contributions To Readiness
Based upon the data and the comparisons presented in Chapter III,
the following relationships have been established. Readiness to fly
a jet carrier aircraft is a function of at least these variables*
1. Model aircraft flown in proficiency assignment.
2. Time since last jet flight.
3. Time since last regular flying assignment.
4o Model aircraft flown previously.
5. Total jet flight hours.
6. Total flight hours.
With the exception of the variable, "Time since last jet flight," the
data is consistent and significant. Additionally, the three postulates
derived from the "Psychological" section of Chapter II have been proven
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and are now stated as conclusions.
lo Large losses in skill occur over time; however, the actual
function of the decrement is specific to the particular type of
flying
o
2o Flying facilitates skill retention and the greater the
amount of flight time the greater the facilitation
»
3 The less similarity between the type of operational flying
and the type of previous proficiency flying, the less beneficial the
proficiency flying
„
Implications of the Study
The data compiled and the conclusions derived can be most useful
in re-adjusting current CRT emphases* For example, all Category I?
aviators must meet the same minimum proficiency flight requirements
regardless of their status with regard to future potential and the six
variables treated in this study [ICQ „ Definition and testing of
these variables paves the way for enhancing the efficiency of and
economizing in the Naval Air Combat Readiness Training Program
„
Though the study was directed to a jet carrier training environ-
ment, the method is easily modified for use with other situations
»
A universal potential use for such findings is in programming the
flight training plans of all types of replacement squadrons „ By
detecting and computing the relevant background variables of each
^Category I consists, essentially, of those aviators with less
than 20 years flight experience and under 4-5 years of age Q
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newly reported Fleet Replacement Pilot, plans could be made accordingly
and scarce resources conserved . For example, a pilot of the proper
background category could then be programmed for eight instrument
flights rather than scheduled for the standard ten. Such programming,
in conjunction with other relatively simple statistical methods, could
save significant amounts of manpower, aircraft, and dollar resources.
A study framework has been established, a bibliography compiled, and
selected flight background variables tested. The way stands clear
for future official and academic endeavors to investigate further the
value of Naval Air Combat Readiness Training.
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